Источники

Источники

American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law. Antitrust Law Developments (5^th ed.) 2002.

Anderson M.R. Settle or Roll the Dice? // Litigation. Fall 2001. 28 (1). Р. 37–41.

Anton J, Yao D. Coordination in Split Award Auctions // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1992. 57. Р. 681–707.

Aubert C., Rey P., Kovacic W.E. The Effect of Leniency and Whistleblowing Programs on Cartels // International Journal of Industrial Organization. Forthcoming. 2005.

Ausubel L.M., Cramton P., Milgrom P. The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design. Forthcoming. // P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, R. Steinberg (eds.) Combinatorial Auctions. MIT Press, 2006.

Baker D.I. The Use of Criminal Law Remedies to Deter and Punish Cartels and Bid-Rigging // George Washington Law Review. 2001. 69. Р. 663–720.

Baker J.B. Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Effects Under the Antitrust Laws // New York University Law Review. 2002. 77. Р. 135–203.

Bernheim D. Expert Report of B. Douglas Bernheim, M.D.L. № 1285 // Re: Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, Misc. № 99–0197 (TFH), 24 May 2002.

Breit W., Elzinga K.G. Antitrust Penalty Reform – An Economic Analysis. Washington and London: American Enterprise Institute, 1986.

Calkins S. Corporate Compliance and the Antitrust Agencies’ Bi-Modal Penalties // Law & Contemporary Problems. 1997a. 60 (3). Р. 127–167.

Calkins S. An Enforcement Official’s Reflections on Antitrust Class Actions // Arizona Law Review. 1997b. 39. Р. 412.

Chen J., Harrington J.E. The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path // V. Ghosal, J. Sennek (eds.) Political Economy of Antitrust forthcoming. North-Holland, 2005.

Coase R.H. The Nature of the Firm // Economica. 1937. 4. Р. 386–405.

Connor J.M. Price-Fixing Overcharges: Legal and Economic Evidence: Working Paper № 04–05. American Antitrust Institute, 2005.

Connor J.M. Global Price Fixing: Our Customers Are the Enemy. Series: Studies in Industrial Organization. Vol. 24. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001.

Cooter R. Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution // California Law Review. 1985. 73. Р. 1–51.

Eichenwald K. The Informant: A True Story. N.Y.: Broadway Books, 2000.

Evenett S.J., Levenstein M.C., Suslow V.Y. International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990s, OECD Global Forum on Competition. 2002.

European Commission. The Commission of the European Communities Decision of 21 November 2001, Case COMP/E-1/37.512-Vitamins // Official Journal of the European Communities. 1 October 2003.

First H. The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecution and the Coming of International Competition Law // Antitrust Law Journal. 2001. 68. Р. 711–734.

Fuller J.G. The Gentleman Conspirators: The Story of the Price-Fixers in the Electrical Industry. N.Y.: Grove Press, 1962.

Gavil A.I., Kovacic W.E., Baker J.B. Antitrust Law in Perspective: Cases, Concepts and Problems in Competition Policy. St. Paul: West Group, 2002.

Genesove D., Mullin W.P. Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Suger Institute Case // American Economic Review. 2001. 91. Р. 379–398.

Global Competition Review. 2004. Cartel Regulation. (www.globalcompetitionreview.com)

Graham D.A., Marshall R.C. Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second Price and English Auctions // Journal of Political Economy. 1987. 95. Р. 1217–1239.

Grossman P.Z. (ed.) How Cartels Endure and How They Fail: Studies of Industrial Collusion. Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2004.

Guersant O. European Commission Adopted Ten Decisions Imposing Heavy Fines on Hard Core Cartels in 2001, Directorate for Competition, European Commission. 2002.

Haberbush K.L. Limiting the Government’s Exposure to Bid Rigging Schemes: A Critical Look at the Sealed Bidding Regime // Public Contract Law Journal. 2000. 30. Р. 97–122.

Hendricks K., Porter R.H. An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information // American Economic Review. 1988. 78. Р. 865–883.

Herling J. The Great Price Conspiracy: The Story of the Antitrust Violations in the Electrical Industry. Washington: R. B. Luce, 1962.

Hirshleifer J., Riley J.G. The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC) to the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust. Final Report, US Department of Justice, 2000.

Klemperer P. What Really Matters in Auction Design // Journal of Economic Perspectives. Winter 2002. 16. Р. 169–189.

Kolasky W.J. Antitrust Compliance Programs: The Government Perspective, Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice. 2002. (http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/11534.htm)

Kovacic W.E., Shapiro C. Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking // Journal of Economic Perspectives. 2000. 14. Р. 43–61.

Kovacic WE. Private Monitoring and Antitrust Enforcement: Paying Informants to Reveal Cartels // George Washington Law Review. 2001. 69. Р. 766–797.

Kovacic W.E. The Modern Evolution of US Competition Policy Enforcement Norms // Antitrust Law Journal. 2003. 71. Р. 377–478.

Lopomo G., Marshall R.C., Marx L.M. Inefficiency of Collusion at English Auctions // Contributions to Theoretical Economics. 2005. 5 (1). Article 4.

Mailath G., Zemsky P. Collusion in Second Price Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders // Games and Economic Behavior. 1991. 3. Р. 467–486.

Marshall R.C., Marx L.M. Bidder Collusion. Forthcoming // Journal of Economic Theory. 2006.

Marshall R.C., Marx L.M., Raiff M.E. Cartel Price Announcements: The Vitamins Industry: Working Paper. Duke University, 2005.

Marshall R.C., Meurer M.J. Bidder Collusion and Antitrust Law: Refining the Analysis of Price Fixing to Account for the Special Features of Auction Markets // Antitrust Law Journal. 2004. 72. Р. 83–118.

McAfee R.P., McMillan J. Bidding Rings // American Economic Review. 1992. 82. Р. 579–599.

Motta M., Polo M. Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution // International Journal of Industrial Organization. 2003. 21. Р. 347–379.

Myerson R.B. Optimal Auction Design // Mathematics of Operations Research. 1981. 6. Р. 58–73.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Cartels: Sanctions Against Individuals. 2005. (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/46/34306028.pdf)

Riley J.G., Samuelson W.F. Optimal Auctions // American Economic Review. 1981. 71. Р. 381–392.

Robinson M.S. Collusion and the Choice of Auction // RAND Journal of Economics. 1985. 16. Р. 141–145.

Scott S. Cartel Enforcement: International and Canadian Developments // B. Hawk (ed.) International Antitrust Law and Policy, Fordham Corporate Law Institute. 2005. Р. 33–56.

Spagnolo G. Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust. Forthcoming // P. Buccirossi (ed.) Handbook of Antitrust Economics. MIT Press, 2005.

Spratling G.R. Detection and Deterrence: Rewarding Informants for Reporting Violations // George Washington Law Review. 2001. 69. Р. 798–823.

Stigler G.J. A Theory of Oligopoly // Journal of Political Economy. 1964. 72. Р. 44–61.

Vann D.E., Jr., Litwan E.E. Recent Developments in International Cartel Enforcement // Getting the Deal Through: Cartel Regulation (Global Competition Review). 2004.

Williamson O.E. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. N.Y.: The Free Press, 1975.

Wils W.P.J. Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer? // World Competition. 2005. 28 (2). Р. 117–159.

Wils W.P.J. Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe? // World Competition. 2003. 26. Р. 473–488.